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GOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS
In conclusion, a takings claim is likely to fail under the Federal
and New York State constitutional standards when a petitioner
was aware of the inherent limitations on the property at the time
of purchase 37 and the governmental body had a valid legislative
purpose for its regulation. 3 1 In addition, when a property has
merely suffered a diminution in value,' 39 the regulation has not
interfered with the petitioner's reasonable investment backed
expectations,"4 and the limitation does not entirely extinguish the
Petitioner's economic and recreational use of the property, no
taking will have occurred. 4'
Kim v. City of New York'
(decided February 18, 1997)
Plaintiff, Soon Duck Kim, and other property owners, appealed
from the Supreme Court's decision denying plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and granting the City of New York's
[Hereinafter, "City"], cross-motion for summary judgment. 43
The Supreme Court concluded that no taking of the plaintiffs'
property had occurred "because the City was authorized by New
York City Charter § 2904'" to compel [the] plaintiffs to raise
137 Id.
' Id. at 614, 679 N.E.2d at 1039, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
139 Id. at 618, 679 N.E.2d at 1042, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 619, 679 N.E.2d at 1043, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
142 90 N.Y.2d 1, 681 N.E.2d 312, 659 N.Y.S.2d 145, cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 50 (1997).
143 Id. at 5, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
144 N.Y. Crry CHARTER § 2904 [2] (1992) provides that:
The owner of any property at his own cost, shall... fill any
sunken lot or lots comprising part or all of such property or
cut down any raised lot or lots comprising part or all of such
property whenever the transportation department shall so
order pursuant to standards and policies of the transportation
department .... In the event that the owner fails to comply
with the provisions of this section, the transportation
1998 1083
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their property to the legal grade." 145  The Appellate Division
affirmed. 
146
The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
City engaged in an unconstitutional taking'47 of their property.
when the City placed side fill on approximately 2400 square feet
of their property.148 The court held that critical to a takings
analysis is the question of "whether the allegedly taken property
interest was a stick in the 'bundle of property rights' acquired by
the owner." 149 Here, the court concluded that by "virtue of the
common-law and the City Charter obligation of lateral support to
a public roadway, plaintiffs' title never encompassed the property
interest they claim has been taken." 5 0
Plaintiffs acquired a parcel of land in 1988 adjoining College
Point Boulevard in Queens, New York.'' At the time they
acquired title to the land, a map reflecting the proper grade of
College Point Boulevard was filed in the Office of the Queens
Borough President. 2  The actual grade of College Point
Boulevard in 1988 was 9.1 feet however, the filed map reflected
a legal grade of 13.5 feet. 53 As a result of the grade disparity, in
department may provide for the doing of same at the expense
of the owner in the manner to be provided by local law.
Id.
145 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 5, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
146 Id.
'47 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art.1, § 7(a). This section provides that
"[pirivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." Id.
148 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 5, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
149 Id. at 6, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (citing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)). In Lucas, the court stated:
"[The] recognition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation
when an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those
'existing rules or understandings' is surely unexceptional." Id. at 1030.
110 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 5, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
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1990, the City engaged in a project to raise the roadway to its
legal grade." 54
The City notified plaintiffs in March of 1990 of their obligation
pursuant to the City Charter to raise their property to the legal
grade.'55 The City indicated that if the plaintiffs responded within
ten days, the regarding would be completed by the City at no cost
to plaintiffs. 156  The notice also indicated that if the plaintiffs
failed to respond, the grading would be performed by the City at
a cost to plaintiffs.11 Plaintiffs failed to respond and the City
undertook the regarding of plaintiffs' property.58
According to the court, the pivotal issue in this case centers
around the proposition that "[p]roperty interests... are not
created by the Constitution." 59 The court noted that property
interests are created by state law and existing interpretations of
such laws.16 Having determined that the Constitution was not the
place to begin its analysis, the court began its inquiry with the
common law and the New York City Charter. 161
Plaintiffs' obligation to preserve and maintain the legal grade







15 9 Id. at 5-6, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147. The court reasoned:
Because the State defines the rights and obligations that
constitute "property" in the absence of any superseding
Federal law, the threshold step in a takings inquiry is to
determine whether, in light of the "existing rules or
understandings of State law," plaintiffs ever possessed the




161 Note, however, that even though the court discussed the common law
principles defined by New York case law, the court based its finding that no
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support.6 2  In Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson ,63 the court
stated that an adjacent landowner's duty with respect to the public
roadway "will be somewhat broader" than the duty to an
adjoining private landowner. . ... ,164 The court in Haverstraw
explained that the "preservation of lateral support to a highway as
constructed and prepared for the public use, is an obligation to
the community which rests upon the adjacent landowner."65
The court also cited to a leading treatise" which states that:
An exception to the general rule that the absolute right
to support extends only to the land in its natural state
occurs when the supported land is an adjacent public
highway. The duty to provide lateral support includes
the duty to support the highway in its improved
condition. The courts have held that the public interest
in highways justifies the enlargement in the scope of
duty.
167
Nevertheless, having discussed the above common law
principles, the court decided to base its conclusion that the
,62 See BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 283 (4th ed. 1996). Lateral support is
defined as "[A]n owner of real property has the right to have his land, in its
natural condition, supported and held in place from the sides' by his neighbor's
land." See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (6th ed. 1990). Lateral
support is defined as
The right of lateral and subjacent support is the right to have
land supported by the adjoining land or the soil beneath. The
right of a landowner to the natural support of his land by
adjoining land. The adjoining owner has the duty not to
change his land (such as lowering it) so as to cause this
support to be weakened or removed.
Id.
'63 192 N.Y. 54, 84 N.E. 578 (1908).
164 Id. at 59, 84 N.E. 580. See Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 9, 681 N.E.2d at 316,
659 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
165 Haverstraw, 192 N.Y. at 59, 84 N.E. at 580.
'66 9 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 699[l], at 63-6
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1997).
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plaintiffs were obligated to provide lateral support to the public
roadway on the New York City Charter.'
The court relied on Laba v. Carey69 in reaching its conclusion
that § 2904 of the City Charter was applicable in this case. 70 In
Laba, purchaser unsuccessfully argued that title to the premises
was unmarketable because the existing grade of the public road
was lower than the legal grade and this meant that at some time in
the future he might be required to raise the level of the adjoining
property.171  The court held that such a requirement would
amount to "nothing more than a normal incident to the ownership
of real property within the City of New York. Section 230 of the
New York City Charter [the predecessor provision to § 2904]
places the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
sidewalks on the individual owner." 
1
Applying the principle announced in Laba, the Kim court
concluded that the City Charter obligation of lateral support to the
legal grade was in force when the plaintiffs bought their
property.1 3 Therefore, maintaining legal grade was a normal
incident of ownership of real property within the City of New
York.17 In addition, the Kim court noted that the plaintiffs
acquired their property with constructive notice that the existing
grade was below legal grade, as was established by the filing of a
revised city map in accordance with statutory procedure. 75
I d. The court stated that "the property owner's obligation of lateral
support to a public roadway finds its specific, contemporary formulation in the
New York City Charter" and declined to "define the precise contours of the
common-law duty in this case." Id.
169 29 N.Y.2d 302, 277 N.E.2d 641, 327 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1971).
170 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 11, 681 N.E.2d at 150, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
71 Laba, 29 N.Y.2d at 312, 277 N.E.2d at 647, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
172 Id.
17 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 12, 681 N.E.2d at 318, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 151. The
court stated that the "plaintiffs acquired a 'sunken lot' insofar as it was below
legal grade of the road and, accordingly, took the property subject to the
section 2904 obligation to raise it to the legal grade." Id.
174 fd.
11 Id. "The city map is to be deemed final and conclusive with respect to
the location, width and grades of the streets shown thereon, so far as such
location, width and grades have been duly adopted." Id. (citation omitted).
1998 1087
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The Kim court concluded that the Constitution is implicated
only when plaintiff actually acquires the property interest at issue.
The creation of a property interest is not founded in the
Constitution but in state law. Here, since the plaintiffs purchased
their property subject to the restriction imposed in the City
Charter to provide lateral support, the plaintiffs never acquired an
interest in property that could be the subject of a taking.
7
Judge Smith wrote a lengthy dissent and stated that an
unconstitutional taking occurred when the City placed side fill on
the plaintiffs' property to be used for public purposes without just
compensation.1" Judge Smith argued that the City Charter was
not even applicable here because the plaintiffs' property was not
"sunken" within the meaning of the statute. 78 Moreover, the
common law notion of lateral support that the majority found in
the language of the statute was "certainly open to debate" and
unsupported by the decision in Haverstraw, which the court cited
as authority."'
The majority disposed of Judge Smith's argument that the
plaintiffs' property was not "sunken" within the meaning of the
statute by pointing out that the word "sunken" is amenable to
more than one interpretation. 80 Since the language of the statute
176 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 12, 681 N.E.2d at 318, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 151. The
court stated that the plaintiffs could not convert their deliberate failure to
comply with the City Charter into a takings claim. Id.
'7 Id. at 14, 681 N.E.2d at 319, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
7 Id. at 20-21, 681 N.E.2d at 323, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Judge Smith defined "sunken" as "having sunk
or been sunk beneath the surface or having sunk to a lower level." Id. The
majority defined "sunken" as "below the legal grade of the road." Id. at 12,
681 N.E.2d at 318, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (Smith, J., dissenting). This
distinction is important because if Judge Smith's definition were to prevail, the
City Charter would not apply and therefore the majority's reliance on the City
Charter would be misplaced. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 20, 681 N.E.2d at 323, 659 N.Y.2d at 156 (Smith, J., dissenting).
"OlId. at 13, 681 N.E.2d at 319, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 152. "Thus, while the
dissent might plausibly disagree with the Court's interpretation of section
2904, its concession that the statute 'is amenable to two differing yet
reasonable interpretations' . . . forecloses its contention that the application of
the statute in this case works a taking of plaintiff's property." Id.
[Vol 141088
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can reasonably support differing interpretations, the majority's
interpretation of the word "sunken" is wholly acceptable and
permits application of the City Charter to the plaintiffs
property.1
81
The dissent argued that the doctrine of lateral support founded
in the common law is unsupported by the language of the statute
and by existing case law.'2 Haverstraw, according to the dissent,
established the principle that an adjoining landowner of a public
roadway could not do certain acts upon his own property that
would injure a public street.In The dissent argued that acts such
as excavating or obstructing the lateral support of the public
roadway are impermissible,"s  however, the holding in
Haverstraw said nothing about the "placing of side fill on
property without the owner's consent or about any compensation
due an owner as a result." 1
The majority opinion did not respond to the dissent's assertions
that Haverstraw provided no support for its argument.1' As the
majority noted, it chose not to rely on common law principles in
its finding that no taking had occurred; instead, the majority
relied on the City Charter which it found to be in full force and
effect when plaintiffs purchased their property.
Having determined that in the absence of overriding Federal
law, the state defines the rights and obligations that constitute
property, plaintiffs never acquired an interest free from the
181Id.
'1 Id. at 22-23, 681 N.E.2d at 324-25, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
8 Id. at 23, 681 N.E.2d at 324, 659 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Smith, J., disenting).1 1 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 23, 681 N.E.2d at 325, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority read Haverstraw much too
broadly. Id. "The 'existing understanding' of the obligation of lateral support
clearly does not apply here when it is the City that has caused the disparity."
Id. Basically, the dissent argued that the common law doctrine of lateral
support does not negate the plaintiffs fundamental property right to be free
from governmental invasion of their property. Id.
186 The dissent's argument was futile because the majority did not base its
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obligation to maintain lateral support pursuant to the City
Charter.187 Therefore, a takings claim, under the Federal or State
Constitution cannot be sustained' when plaintiff purchases
property that is subject to an existing restriction.189
17 Kim, 90 N.Y.2d at 6, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
88 Id. at 10, 681 N.E.2d at 317, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
189 Id. at 14, 681 N.E.2d at 319, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 152. The court concluded
that merely enforcing a legal obligation already in place when the plaintiffs
purchased their property does not constitute a taking. Id. In addition,
plaintiffs still own their property in its entirety including the portion abutting
the roadway where the side fill was placed. Id.
1090 [Vol 14
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